This chapter first appeared in *Livelihoods, Natural Resources, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding,* edited by Helen Young and Lisa Goldman. It is one of six edited books on Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Natural Resource Management (for more information, see www.environmentalpeacebuilding.org). The full book can be ordered from Routledge at https://www.routledge.com/products/9781849712330.



Manufacturing Peace in "No Man's Land": Livestock Access to Natural Resources in the Karimojong Cluster of Kenya and Uganda

Jeremy Lind[a]
[a] *Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex*

Online publication date: November 2015

Suggested citation: J. Lind. 2015. Manufacturing Peace in "No Man's Land": Livestock Access to Natural Resources in the Karimojong Cluster of Kenya and Uganda. In *Livelihoods, Natural Resources, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding,* ed. H. Young and L. Goldman. London: Earthscan.

Manufacturing peace in "no man's land": Livestock and access to natural resources in the Karimojong Cluster of Kenya and Uganda

Jeremy Lind

Livestock raiding and banditry in a context of generalized and chronic insecurity have seriously undermined the livelihoods of nomadic pastoralists in the Karimojong Cluster that straddles the remote borderlands of northwestern Kenya and northeastern Uganda—known as the Turkana and Karamoja regions, respectively. Since the 1990s, various aid and donor agencies have worked through local civil society to facilitate conflict resolution, including through negotiation of grazing agreements, as a way to improve relations between herders there. The impact of various peacebuilding initiatives has been fairly negligible, however, in large measure due to the inherently limited ability of local reconciliation efforts to address deeper and wider historical and structural drivers of conflict in the region. This chapter assesses the effectiveness of efforts to manufacture peace in the Karimojong Cluster while also examining the role of natural resources in both conflict and in peacebuilding.

After outlining the author's research in the Turkana region in Kenya, the chapter broadly introduces the situation of armed conflict in the Karimojong Cluster and describes its impact on livelihoods in the region. The second section examines the dynamics of this armed conflict and local peacebuilding efforts to end it. The third section critically examines factors affecting the outcomes of these peacebuilding efforts. The chapter ends with lessons learned and other conclusions, including a discussion of future prospects for peacebuilding in the region against the backdrop of regional and national economic development initiatives.

THE RESEARCH

From 2003 to 2007, the author conducted field research in Turkana County on the Kenyan side of the Karimojong Cluster (including ten months in southern

---

Jeremy Lind is a research fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, where his research focuses on livelihood dynamics in conflict areas and the relationship between population vulnerability and violence in northeast Africa.

Turkana County). Over the course of his research, the author spent a significant amount of time in pastoralist encampments, market centers, the district administrative center, and farming settlements. The author conducted a mixed quantitative and qualitative survey with over one hundred Turkana households as well as interviews with Turkana's most prominent civil society and aid agency peace promoters and local opinion leaders, including elders, women's leaders, youth, head teachers, local councilors, and business persons. In addition, the author reviewed relevant scholarly and gray literatures and conducted follow-up interviews with nongovernmental organization (NGO) staff in Nairobi, Kenya.

INTRODUCTION TO THE CONFLICT, IMPACTS ON LIVELIHOODS, AND RECONCILIATION EFFORTS

The agropastoralist communities located in the Karimojong Cluster have long engaged in violent conflict over access to, and control of, local resources that support their pastoralist lifestyle. Before British colonization (1916–1962) of the region, local populations often raided and stole livestock. The frequency of regional conflict has continued to escalate in recent years, making governance in the region increasingly difficult for local and national authorities. Regional insecurity and violence has led to livestock losses as well as the loss of human life, has threatened sustainable livelihoods of pastoralist communities, and has spurred the international and NGO community to pursue peacebuilding and conflict resolution in the area.

Background

Organized livestock raiding and individualized theft of livestock have long been commonplace in the Karimojong Cluster, a remote and sparsely populated dryland region with several names, including Karamojong, that stretches from northeastern Uganda and southeastern South Sudan across the Turkana region of northwestern Kenya and into the southwestern corner of Ethiopia (see figure 1). It has been estimated that over 10,000 people from the Turkana tribe were killed during livestock raids from 1991 to 1994 alone (McCabe 2004). Because conflict in the Karimojong Cluster has substantial humanitarian consequences, it has received intermittent attention by international news media.[1] Although the entire Karimojong Cluster has been embroiled in conflict at one point or another, the Kenyan and Ugandan sections have received the most attention in terms of peacebuilding, hence the focus on these areas in this chapter.

Prior to British colonial rule, relations between pastoralist societies in the region were characterized by "reciprocal raiding," which, arguably, worked against escalation of hostilities into wider conflict (Lamphear 1994). Livestock raiding served an important redistributive function by transferring animals across social

[1] See, for example, BBC News Online (2006); *Economist* (1999); and *Independent* (2005).



Figure 1. Karimojong Cluster

boundaries in situations of need, such as during drought or when young men sought animals to pay as bride price (Lind 2007). Since then, chronic conflict in the Karimojong Cluster and perceptions of a trend toward worsening violence have caused international agencies engaged in aid policy and programming in the region to shift their activities from development assistance to peacebuilding. Further, on the Ugandan side of the Karimojong Cluster, domestic political pressure has been applied to end raiding by Karimojong pastoralists on their neighbors in Uganda, which earlier, in the 1980s, resulted in heavy losses of livestock and human life (Stites et al. 2007).

There are differing perspectives of conflict dynamics in the region. A popular explanation is that growing scarcity of important natural resources for supporting livestock has caused pastoralists to move over longer distances, thereby bringing them into conflict with each other over access to water, pasture, and browsing opportunities. This view holds sway in news media representations of conflict in the region.[2] Implicitly, this view has also influenced aid interventions to establish a conflict early warning system in the region.

A different view is that the nature of raiding has been transformed from a reciprocal, rule-governed practice into a predatory activity to procure large

[2] For example, Gettleman (2009).

quantities of livestock for sale in the lucrative urban meat markets of East Africa (Hendrickson, Armon, and Mearns 1998). Jan Kamenju and colleagues claim that prominent people have financed livestock raids in the North Rift Valley region of Kenya, including transport of the stolen animals by lorry to down-country urban markets (Kamenju, Singo, and Wairagu 2003). The popular media in Kenya have supported this perspective, reporting suspected links between deadly raids in Turkana and neighboring areas of the Karimojong Cluster and large, criminal syndicates (*Daily Nation* 1999). The problem is thought to have been exacerbated by the influx of small arms from elsewhere in the Horn of Africa, beginning in the early 1980s (Gray 2000; Mirzeler and Young 2000; Pike 2004; and Mkutu 2006).

Effect on livelihoods

The weakening of customary pastoralist institutions to manage conflict, as well as the failure of the Ugandan and Kenyan governments to provide security for herding groups in the Karimojong Cluster, has severely impacted the livelihoods of the region's predominantly pastoralist inhabitants. Chronic conflict has led to the loss of livestock assets across all sections of society, regardless of economic status. For many households, herd size has diminished to the point of material insignificance; as a consequence, livestock transfers have decreased and, with that, the means to build a livelihood safety net. Further, the circulation of stolen animals through legitimate livestock exchanges—a technique favored by stock thieves as a way to dispose of contraband animals—has compromised the smooth functioning of commercial exchanges based on trust.

In addition, armed violence has impeded the movement of livestock to key grazing environments. Due to interference by raiders equipped with small arms, Turkana pastoralists in Kenya have felt insecure in moving their herds to distant pastures in the uplands bordering Karamoja in Uganda, and West Pokot, Kenya, to such an extent that George Monbiot, a well-known British journalist, has labeled these uplands "no man's lands" (Monbiot 1994). For the Turkana, the long-term impact has been displacement to the bottom of the ecological gradient—the drier, less fertile Turkana lowlands—and, as a consequence, they have had to shift the composition of their herds, from cattle to more drought-tolerant, less valuable livestock, such as goats (Lind and Eriksen 2006).

In sum, loss of assets and conflict-induced displacement from key natural resources have rendered the Karimojong Cluster pastoralists far less able to manage the consequences of the ecological uncertainty and variability that is entirely normal in the region.

Reconciliation efforts

Against this backdrop, beginning in the late 1990s, various international aid and donor agencies decided to support various local-level reconciliation efforts,

primarily by supporting dialogue as a way to build confidence and better social relations between neighboring pastoralist groups regarding access and use of natural resources for supporting livestock herds. Local male elders, local herdswomen, and young men who engage in raiding ("warriors") were all encouraged to participate in the dialogue—and in the negotiation of agreements—with the goal of creating a culture of peace that relied less on "outside" administrative responses. These efforts subsequently helped foster the growth of an elaborate institutional landscape of local peace committees whose role has been to prevent conflict alongside official state responses, the latter of which have included forced disarmament, tracking and recovery of stolen livestock, and punitive actions against raiders (Knighton 2003; Stites et al. 2007; and Stites and Akabwai 2009).

As background, it should be noted that these official state responses, primarily by Ugandan administrative, security, and police personnel, have been carried out in an environment of mutual hostility and mistrust between the state and pastoralist societies and, indeed, some pastoralists view the state itself as a "raider" (Knighton 2003). By contrast, on the Kenyan side, beyond periodic crackdowns by security personnel on communities that are thought to be raiding instigators, the national government has failed to muster anything resembling a robust security response, choosing, instead, to provide tepid and largely symbolic support primarily to peacebuilding NGOs.

While localized peacebuilding efforts in the Karimojong Cluster have clearly been important as an adjunct to state security responses to armed conflict (as in Uganda) or to lack of state security responses (as in Kenya) and for initiating reconciliation within and among neighboring pastoralist societies, the impacts of peacebuilding efforts have been limited. This chapter explores and critically assesses why this has been the case, the role of natural resources in the conflict, and deeper and wider historical and structural factors affecting prospects for peace.

CONFLICT DYNAMICS AND PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS IN THE KARIMOJONG CLUSTER

Chronic conflict in the Karimojong Cluster and its detrimental impacts on pastoralist livelihoods have given rise to a multitude of localized reconciliation efforts, the primary focus of which has been to improve relations between neighboring pastoralist groups. Further, other complementary actions have been taken to improve pastoralist livelihoods, such as extension of community-based animal health care and promotion of irrigated agriculture as an alternative to livestock production. Preventing conflict over natural resources has been an ancillary objective to promoting broader peace between groups, for it has been hoped that broader peace would permit greater mobility and flexibility in access to and use of resources across a wider geographic area.

Why, then, have these peace initiatives been limited in their effectiveness? In exploring this in detail, this chapter considers the social and ecological dynamics

of pastoralism and conflict in the Karimojong Cluster, with a focus on the Turkana pastoralists of northwest Kenya.

Making a living in an uncertain environment

Precolonial-era livestock raiding in the Karimojong Cluster was enmeshed in strategies for managing uncertainty in a nonequilibrium ecological setting. Such strategies included raiding neighboring herds as a way, for example, to recover losses due to drought or an epidemic of animal disease. As an ecological setting that lacks equilibrium by nature, the Karimojong Cluster is dominated by dry rangelands broken by hills and mountains that support a mix of scrub, hilltop forests, and natural springs. As a particular setting within the Karimojong Cluster, the Turkana lowland ranges constitutes one of the driest environments in the Horn of Africa in which pastoralism is practiced, and uncertainty and low predictability of rainfall are the norm. Years of severe drought occur at roughly three- to five-year intervals, with severe adverse effects on rangeland vegetation and livestock health (Little, Dyson-Hudson, and McCabe 1999).

Under these difficult conditions, the Turkana developed a system of pastoralism centered on mobility and flexibility as a means to sustain their livestock. Customarily, Turkana herders would split their multispecies herds on the basis of their varying feeding and water requirements and then move these split herds over long distances to maximize use of key patches of food and water resources. Thus, the adaptability of Turkana pastoralism depended not only on mobilization of herds to access resources but also on flexibility of movement across the highland-lowland ecological gradient that stretches between the higher elevation areas of West Pokot (to the south of Turkana) and of Uganda to the expansive, low plains of Turkanaland itself.

Social ties between the Turkana and their neighbors helped the Turkana negotiate access to resources in Pokot and sites on the Ugandan side of the border. Considerable environmental variation favored development of specialized production systems and, correspondingly, group identities. In the dynamic lie of the land, a multiethnic social order based on "eco-niche specialization" took root (Goldsmith 1997). As Neil W. Sobania has elucidated, the structure of these pastoralist societies was comparatively loose and adaptable; that is, different groups adapted to particular ecological niches by developing particular production strategies and techniques for generating livelihoods from their particular place in the land. Sobania has shown further how the adaptations of neighboring groups to the peculiarities of separate but complementary ecological niches enabled them to establish bond-friendships across societal boundaries (Sobania 1990). In turn, as Richard D. Waller has explained, these bond-friendships proved critical in binding these pastoralist societies together within the context of a wider regional resource system (Waller 1999). Good relations between the Turkana and their neighbors were then maintained through intermarriage, trade and exchange relationships, negotiated resource-use agreements, and reciprocal livestock transfers.

Dynamics and impacts of contemporary conflict in the region

The main type of contemporary conflict in the Karimojong Cluster has been cross-border attacks on neighboring pastoralist societies by organized parties of up to several hundred men intending to raid livestock. However, Elizabeth Stites and colleagues have noted changes in the nature of conflict in the Karamoja region of northeastern Uganda in direct response to disarmament campaigns against Karimojong herders by the Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF); although the number of large, organized raids has decreased in Karamoja, the number of raids by smaller bands of men (unsanctioned in their actions by traditional leaders) has increased (Stites et al. 2007). In addition, the goal of these smaller raids is to steal livestock for individual gain by barter or sale. Further, other criminal activity, such as attacks on and acts of theft against village settlements, including by young men within the society, has grown worse as individuals strive to cope with the weakening of livelihoods they can no longer defend due to their disarmament.

Women have been disproportionately affected by these trends. Stites and Darlington Akabwai have reported attacks on women by raiders and bandits on the Ugandan side of the Karimojong Cluster, particularly when women are in remote areas collecting natural resources for food and shelter to compensate for the lack of access to the pastoralists' normal livelihood asset—their livestock—because it is confined in military kraals (Stites and Akabwai 2009).[3] A similar trend of attacks has been apparent in Turkana, including against women gatherers in the bush. There, *ngoroko* (small bands of thieves) have not only taken increasingly to attacking these women but also isolated homesteads and vehicles plying desolate roads (Buchanan-Smith and Lind 2005).

Questioning links between natural resource scarcity and conflict in the region

Importantly, there is neither a simple, direct link of causation between scarce natural resources and conflict in the region nor, indeed, any singular reason for the region's chronic, armed violence. High levels of uncertainty and variability in rainfall and natural resource scarcities are normal ecological features of the Karimojong Cluster. These ecological features have largely defined past and present pastoralist social relations. That is to say that, regardless of variability in their shared climate, the social relations of pastoralists in the region historically has been and continues to alternate between open hostility and cooperation. Another important clarification is that scarcity of natural resources in the region does not necessarily indicate a trend of deteriorating ecological conditions and, thus, a possible cause of conflict.

---

[3] A kraal is a confinement required by the Ugandan military to protect the livestock of pastoralists who have been disarmed.

These caveats are particularly critical to consider when assessing the efficacy of peace interventions and certain media and aid organization representations of and discourses about conflict in the region as being the result of desperate acts by impoverished herders attempting through violence to claim scarce resources in an increasingly degraded environment. Many Turkana explain that violence follows the movements of livestock, emphasizing that acquisition of livestock is the primary motive for armed violence, not the desire to capture key resources, such as grazing sites (Lind 2007). In addition, emphasis on drought-induced resource scarcities as an explanation of conflict has the potential to divert attention from other historical and structural factors that may play a role in encouraging activities such as raiding, as well as from governmental failures to control the security situation (Cullis and Pacey 1992). Indeed, the failure of states to provide timely and appropriate security for pastoralists has been common across the region.

Historical and structural contexts

Acknowledging deep and wide historical and structural contexts is critical to understanding the causes of conflict and patterns of livelihood vulnerability in the region, and, thus, to understanding the limitations of local peacebuilding efforts. As explained above, customary institutions, including flexible boundaries and social fluidity, served as important adjuncts to herding strategies and helped to minimize conflict between pastoralist societies in precolonial times. However, these institutions were weakened by the process of state building in East Africa. This process included use of military force against pastoralist societies to pacify them (Lamphear 1992); punitive confiscation of livestock that destroyed livelihoods; prohibitions on barter and trade between pastoralists; commoditization rather than the traditional exchange, loan, or barter of livestock (Dietz 1993; Fratkin 1991; Little 1985; Zaal and Dietz 1999); and imposition of state practices of control, such as restrictions on livestock movements for a wide range of reasons (Sobania 1990; Waller 1999), the result of which was the creation of fixed, territorially defined ethnic units and more rigid social relations, with detrimental consequences for pastoralist management of ecological uncertainty and resource scarcities.

Some of these detrimental state-building practices continue to this day. In Uganda, the disarmament campaign started in 2006 has involved forced kraaling of pastoralist livestock at sites adjacent to military barracks (essentially military kraals). Establishing these kraals was one way the UPDF responded to the failure of its earlier disarmament operation, conducted in Karamoja in 2001 and early 2002. That operation had worsened insecurity when the communities the UPDF had disarmed sought to rearm themselves in the face of continued threats against them—including the threat of theft from individual bandits as well as livestock raids by pastoralists in neighboring countries that had not been disarmed (Stites et al. 2007). The latest operation, whereby livestock is confined in the shadow

of military barracks and therefore assumed to be secure, has created its own problems, however. Notably, under this latest exercise, military officials decide the movements of livestock, even though they lack the herding expertise to make informed decisions on when and where to move the animals. In addition, livestock diseases spread more easily in confined spaces. Also, it has been difficult for members of herding units to access their livestock, either for sale or to get milk to feed vulnerable household members (Stites and Akabwai 2009).

Ultimately, pastoralist conflict and vulnerability in the region today are rooted in deeper and wider historical and structural processes that degraded customary pastoralist institutions (institutions such as reciprocal resource-use agreements, intermarriage, and mutually beneficial trade and exchange). The way in which the Ugandan military has increased its role in responding to livestock raids has marginalized elders who traditionally played important roles in peacebuilding between different groups (Stites and Akabwai 2009). In the past, customary pastoralist institutions encouraged more flexible access to key natural resources across borders and wider herd movements by promoting cross-border bonding, thus strengthening pastoralists' capacities to manage the consequences of droughts and lengthy dry seasons. Arguably, then, the degradation of these customary institutions can be seen as the cause both of conflict and of livelihood vulnerability.

Peacebuilding in an environment of conflict and social violence

Although conflict and a high level of social violence are normal in the Karimojong Cluster—and not symptomatic of ecological changes being driven by climate changes, as some NGOs working in the region and the international media have suggested—peacebuilding became an important activity for aid and donor agencies working in the region. As noted earlier, beginning in the 1990s, many aid agencies began supporting localized peacebuilding initiatives in an effort to rebuild confidence and trust between neighboring pastoralist groups. An important part of these efforts has been the goal of sharing access to natural resources. In Uganda, donors have also advocated that economic development efforts take place alongside disarmament campaigns or, at least, that the sequencing of economic development efforts and disarmament activities be improved. Donors support this tandem approach because disarmament, on its own, could be counterproductive and aggravate tensions (Stites et al. 2007).

Three main sets of peacebuilding activities

Over time, aid and donor agencies have supported three main sets of peacebuilding activities.

Early warning networks. The first main set of peacebuilding activities has involved gathering information useful for early warning of the potential for

conflict or reporting actual conflict through two networks—the Famine Early Warning System–Network (FEWS-Net) and the Conflict Early Warning and Response Network (CEWARN)—and use of this information for conflict intervention or amelioration (primarily at the instigation of conflict managers receiving CEWARN reports).

Turkana County is the only part of the Horn of Africa region involved in the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development's (IGAD's) CEWARN system,[4] which reports information it has gathered about conflicts to NGO and government officials, who then work with local authority figures to defuse conflict situations. Turkana County is also covered by FEWS-Net, a multi-donor and aid agency–sponsored project that assesses food security indicators across the Greater Horn of Africa by gathering information from grassroots sources, such as village chiefs, on agro-ecological conditions, pastoralist herd migration patterns, communal relations, and the potential for armed attacks. FEWS-Net also collects satellite data every ten days and correlates that information with local information to forecast possible conflict.[5] All of this information is then reported up the chain to the national-level FEWS-Net office in Nairobi, Kenya, as well as to CEWARN officials in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

CEWARN's specific function is to collate field reports on armed attacks, including livestock losses and human fatalities, and supply that information to conflict managers, who then mobilize to prevent further violence. For example, such mobilization might involve calling a meeting of tribal leaders from both sides, along with area security officials, to negotiate pasture or water sharing agreements. In the end, while the information that FEWS-Net collects is of interest for preventing conflict, it is CEWARN that reports to conflict managers so that action can be taken.

One advantage of this early warning system is that it collects agro-ecological data that can then be used to project the likely movements of herding units and their contact with potentially insecure areas. The weakness of this approach is that it depends on early response from the state—in this particular case, from the Kenyan government—which has not been forthcoming. As noted earlier, chronic insecurity in the Karimojong Cluster is due in part to the failure of the state to provide such a response. If early warnings are to result in early action, that action needs to be by the state, as few other institutions have sufficient legitimacy.

Peace meetings. The second main set of peacebuilding activities by donor-funded aid agencies has been facilitation of peace meetings between elders, youth leaders, and women from competing pastoralist groups, as well as local government and aid agency officials. An inherent strength of this approach is that it establishes new platforms for social bonding between different ethnic and clan groups and,

---

[4] IGAD is a regional organization of East African countries dedicated to achieving peace, prosperity, and regional integration.

[5] FEWS-Net field officer interviewed by the author, June 2, 2004, Kenya.

thus, provides a basis for dialogue and negotiation on access to natural resources in borderlands and outlying areas.

Such peace meetings were pioneered in the late 1990s by the African Union–Interafrican Bureau for Animal Resources (AU-IBAR), a technical veterinary agency. Before its effort ended in 2003, AU-IBAR used vaccination campaigns in northern Turkana and neighboring areas of southern Sudan (now South Sudan) as an entry point to nurture close ties with traditional leaders, such as elders, seers, and generals, who, heretofore, had mostly been neglected in other development initiatives (Grahn 2005). Initially, in discussions initiated by AU-IBAR, these traditional leaders explained how insecurity was a major constraint on keeping livestock and impeded further implementation of community-based animal health services. Responding, AU-IBAR then organized peace meetings in borderlands and outlying areas and tried to increase participation not only by traditional leaders but by young men involved in raiding.

Distinguishing elements of these peace meetings included that they were cross-border, involved traditional leaders, and promoted the role of women in peacebuilding (Grahn 2005). They also drew on traditional symbols of peace, such as "burying the hatchet," which, in this case, meant burying knives and weapons at a peace meeting, the exchange of traditional stools, and conduct of *alogita a ng'aberu*, a traditional, social ceremony involving women coming together around a common purpose or need. Another traditional symbol employed during the meetings was *epiding*—a pass or path understood as a gateway between neighboring pastoralist groups that often overlaps points of access to key natural resources for herds (Grahn 2005).

AU-IBAR subsequently utilized the concept of epiding to map local institutions that determine access to natural resources in borderlands. For example, epiding was invoked in discussions between the Turkana and neighboring Toposa along the Kenya–South Sudan border to develop plans to manage grazing and water resources during the dry season. The involvement of leaders in evoking epiding was central to the striking of a very localized agreement regarding these resources and communication of this agreement to herding groups on both sides of the border (Grahn 2005).

A peace infrastructure. A third main set of peacebuilding efforts has involved establishing a peace infrastructure to communicate peace messages and inculcate a culture of peace. In recent years, various aid agencies and faith-based organizations have instituted an elaborate peace infrastructure in Turkana consisting of *adakar* (neighborhood) peace and development committees (community peace groups), village peace committees, and area-specific security and border committees. This intricate assemblage was established at a dizzying pace in response to interest by donors in supporting such initiatives and has proliferated into what amounts to "the business of peace" (Eaton 2008, 92). Engagement in such initiatives has involved quite an variety of organizations, including the Intermediate Technology and Development Group, World Vision, SNV (a Netherlands-based

international NGO), Veterinarians without Borders–Belgium, the Arid Lands Resource Management Project, the National Council of Churches of Kenya, and the Reformed Church of East Africa, as well as a compendium of community-based organizations.

Like the peace meetings facilitated by AU-IBAR, here too there have been efforts to revive traditional peacebuilding symbols. For example, members of decentralized peace committees have been trained in conflict prevention, management, and resolution in a way designed to raise the profile of such traditional structures as the Ekitoe Angi-kiliok, or the "Elders' Tree."[6]

Village-level committees have the potential advantage of being able to act with unity of purpose in undertaking peacebuilding and policing in their villages.[7] However, this presupposes existence of a single, village-level peacebuilding structure when, in actuality, several overlapping structures often exist under the control of different local leaders, resulting in competition as well as duplication of responsibilities.

A 2003 review by Oxfam–Great Britain of its peace initiatives in Kenya's arid districts found that the possibility of donor funding had led to a number of parallel peacebuilding activities, poor coordination, and tensions between different NGO actors doing peacebuilding work (Oxfam-GB 2003). Later, interviews with the heads of NGO peace projects in Turkanaland revealed a total lack of communication among different peace managers in many cases and a palpable sense of competition and tension between different peace structures (Lind 2007). A few years earlier, Richard Grahn had noted the same and gone on to conclude that the lack of coordination among NGOs was a significant impediment to effective peacebuilding in the Karimojong Cluster. Specifically, he explained that because NGOs operating in the Karimojong Cluster had been unable to agree on a common approach, this had led "to the absurd situation where one location might contain two different peace committees, related to and visited by two different supporting organisations" (Grahn 2005, 18).

Subsequently, although the Turkana District Peace and Development Committee (later renamed *Riam Riam*) was established to coordinate the various peacebuilding activities in the district, it came to be regarded with some suspicion by many Turkana (as revealed in interviews) as just another structure competing for donor funding (Lind 2007). This dovetails with Dave Eaton's finding that many inhabitants of the Karimojong Cluster have come to view peacebuilding efforts by NGOs as irrelevant, which, he has argued, may explain the cynicism, corruption, and incompetence among many of the local organizations working on peacebuilding (Eaton 2008).

---

[6] Chair of the Turkana Peace and Development Organization interviewed by the author, 2004, Kenya.

[7] Community peace worker with World Vision interviewed by the author, 2003, Kenya.

Implications of peacebuilding efforts

While the various peacebuilding initiatives discussed above have generated new insights into contemporary constraints on pastoralist livelihoods in the Karimojong Cluster, little has changed in fundamental patterns of armed violence centered on livestock raiding. In addition to critiques outlined above, in reviewing the impact of AU-IBAR's peacebuilding efforts, Grahn has concluded that they were "broad and shallow, with effective sensitisation of communities but limited impact on root causes" (Grahn 2005, 17). Yet another assessment of peace meetings facilitated by AU-IBAR found they had failed to substantially reduce levels of conflict and violence, build trust, or reestablish security in key grazing and farming environments (CAPE Unit 2004).

Despite these various peacebuilding efforts, agricultural lands in the riparian zones of southern Turkana straddling the Turkwel and Kerio Rivers have been abandoned due to the continuing threat of armed attacks; borderland villagers and pastoralists have continued to restrict livestock movements and livelihood activities to tending farm plots and engaging in trade in market centers; and none of the grazing agreements facilitated by AU-IBAR have lasted, due to incomplete or weak participation by community leaders, youth, local authorities, and state security authorities. In fact, an AU-IBAR-facilitated agreement for the sharing of resources in south Turkana broke down when raiders took livestock from one of the kraal leaders key to the negotiations (Grahn 2005).

FACTORS AFFECTING PEACEBUILDING SUCCESS

Many factors have played a role in the limited effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts in the Karimojong Cluster. These include the structural framing of conflict dynamics in the region, the region's physical geography and nonequilibrium setting, limited grassroots support for largely aid-driven initiatives, and a lack of a clear end to the conflict.

Structural framing of conflict dynamics in the region

Fundamentally, the limited effectiveness of peacebuilding efforts in the Karimojong Cluster relates to the structural framing of conflict dynamics in the region and the lack of regional and national interventions to address historical causes underlying vulnerability and violence. As noted earlier, according to many astute observers and analysts, in these borderlands, state-building processes resulted in deterioration of customary structures for promoting social ties across ecological and group-identity boundaries. Loss of these social ties, which provided for flexibility and mobility in precolonial times, has, in postcolonial times, resulted in pastoralists becoming confined or ghettoized in tribal territories that completely lack association with the human and ecological requirements of pastoralism.

An evaluation of lessons learned from AU-IBAR's peacebuilding work found that such local-level approaches were not sufficient to have more than a limited impact on structural changes and other proximate root causes of conflict in the region (Grahn 2005). While local-level peacebuilding work in the Karimojong Cluster has correctly focused on providing platforms for cross-border dialogue as a way to build trust between groups, this has not altered a historical legacy of underdevelopment and lack of public investment and, also, of inappropriate development interventions (such as encouraging pastoralists to become full-time farmers) that have served only to worsen pastoralists' vulnerability, including through erosion of assets and heightened levels of poverty (Broch-Due and Storas 1983; Hogg 1987). The efficacy of localized peacebuilding initiatives has also been circumscribed by the continued failure of state security operations targeting pastoralists, most notably disarmament campaigns conducted by the Ugandan military targeting Karimojong herders.

Another problem has been the predominant view that conflict dynamics in the Karimojong Cluster center on competition for scarce natural resources in an increasingly degraded environment, for this has justified local-level reconciliation efforts that tend not to address underlying structural dynamics. While local peacebuilding efforts have been important for facilitating dialogue and negotiation to expand access to natural resources, these local approaches have tended to address only manifestations of chronic conflict. In the absence of complementary regional and national efforts around the rule of law, such efforts cannot meaningfully address underlying structural dynamics that have long framed armed violence in the region (Lind and Eriksen 2006). As noted earlier, these underlying structural dynamics include historical underdevelopment and marginalization of pastoralist areas. In addition, although notable progress has been made in generating early warning information on possible outbreaks of armed violence, early responses have been lacking.

Regional geography and nonequilibrium

Another factor affecting the success of peacebuilding efforts in the Karimojong Cluster is the region's physical geography, which covers an expanse of territory stretching across the frontiers of four nation-states (Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda). Within the borders of Kenya, Turkana County alone covers an area of a size roughly equivalent to Sierra Leone. Thus, implementation of peacebuilding activities by NGOs and local civil society groups based primarily in the region's large administrative centers and permanent settlements has been patchy at best, particularly given a lack of coordination among these groups, as previously noted.

Related to the region's physical geography is the region's nonequilibrium setting, meaning, in this case, a setting of ecological uncertainty and variability. As Grahn has noted, although "peace meetings, dialogues and crusades all seemed to be having some sort of impact . . . many of the achievements made seemed

eventually to falter due to the unremitting harshness of the environment and the situation would gradually slip backwards" (Grahn 2005, 17). As explicated earlier, the adaptability of the region's pastoralists to their environment has been based on managing conditions of ecological uncertainty and variability, including through a variety of interactions that can and do shift over time. Precolonial relations were characterized by reciprocal raiding and transgressive behavior by youth (including livestock raiding for bride price and individualized banditry), as well as by considerable cooperation and mutually beneficial intermarriage and trade. Thus, the breakdown of a grazing agreement negotiated by AU-IBAR following a raid against a key kraal leader was not surprising, for the normal pattern of social interaction between herding groups in the context of a non-equilibrium setting alternates between treating each other as enemies or allies. Ecological uncertainty dictates the need for fluidity in social relations, meaning that, as ecological conditions change, the need for open-ended negotiation and dialogue and the ability to cross boundaries change—all of which make it difficult to reach and enforce a fixed agreement.

Lack of grassroots support

Peacebuilding efforts in the region have been largely driven and supported by donor-supported aid agencies and modeled, in part, on the pioneering efforts of Somali women in the 1990s to reduce levels of armed violence connected to livestock raiding in Kenya's North Eastern Province.[8] The agencies involved in the Karimojong Cluster, including AU-IBAR and Oxfam–Great Britain, have made important contributions to peacebuilding there by learning from and utilizing customary peace symbols and by working with elders, women, and warriors. Also, working alongside civil society organizations, aid agencies have helped establish local peace structures and facilitate local peace meetings. Nonetheless, the legitimacy of these new peace structures has been questioned as structures established to attract donor funds. Viewed at the grassroots level as being initiated by outside actors and under the control of individuals eager to curry favor with larger powers, many of these structures have lacked credibility at the grassroots level and, therefore, have lacked grassroots support (Lind and Eriksen 2006; Eaton 2008).

No clear end to the conflict

Complicating PCNRM in the region is lack of a clear end to the conflict, just as there was no clear beginning. The historical experience of the region's pastoralist societies has been such that entire generations have been socialized in a context of high levels of violence and insecurity. Many in the region have

[8] Kenya's North Eastern Province is located outside of the Karimojong Cluster.

never known peace, as envisioned and promoted by aid and donor agencies, nor are they familiar with the notions of peace promoted by NGOs through their efforts.

LESSONS LEARNED

In addressing ongoing conflict in the Karimojong Cluster, the international community has learned fundamental lessons in post-conflict peacebuilding that are relevant to both the Karimojong region and for other post-conflict situations. Crucial peacebuilding considerations include recognizing the limits of local-level reconciliation, identifying what is needed for conflict reduction, and fostering local support of and confidence in peacebuilding efforts.

Limits of local-level reconciliation

Importantly, the shift to peacebuilding by aid programming entities in the Karimojong Cluster has provided support for activities that, it is hoped, will generate greater insights into the nature of conflict there, reasons for continuation of armed violence, and what types of assistance might strengthen livelihoods in such a deeply insecure setting. Notwithstanding these potentially beneficial outcomes, the failure of peacebuilding efforts to broker lasting peace in the Karimojong Cluster serves as a stark reminder of the limits of local-level reconciliation work in a context of structural conflict, generalized insecurity, and absence of the rule of law. Local peacebuilding efforts have been an adjunct to, not a substitute for, the failure of state authorities to provide lasting security for the region's pastoralists. Further, the many initiatives focused on reconciling neighboring groups have tried to address local manifestations of armed violence rather than root causes of conflict.

While localized peacebuilding efforts have been valuable for promoting greater social connectivity that may help people cope with the consequences of conflict and ecological uncertainty, and while promoting dialogue between groups to improve relations governing access to natural resources may lead to a temporary reduction in hostilities, in practice, these efforts have been undermined by continued raiding and banditry, which have their own inner logic and workings that relate to the region's history and social, political, and economic structures. Thus, a fundamental lesson learned from peacebuilding work in the Karimojong Cluster is that its longer-term effectiveness hinges on complementary efforts to address structural inequality and underdevelopment (Lind 2006).

Addressing conflict reduction

The Karimojong region has a long history of violent conflict. Addressing the root causes of conflict and advancing peacebuilding efforts require both improved governance and security, and economic growth of the region.

Needed: Security and rule of law

Another lesson to be drawn from peacebuilding efforts in the Karimojong Cluster concerns the implicit understanding of pastoralist conflict that has informed most conflict-reduction approaches in the region. Resolving conflict is not exclusively—or even foremost—about reconciling neighboring pastoralist groups that are fighting over scarce resources. As Eaton has explained, "at the end of the dry season, they [pastoralists in the region] often are faced with the choice of sharing what little grazing and water remains, or fighting to defend their resources against a well-armed opponent with nothing to lose. The choice is obvious, and only in rare circumstances will a destitute ethnic group be denied access to scarce resources" (Eaton 2008, 101). Thus, ultimately, it is unhelpful to treat the conflict as being tied to a local set of circumstances or, alternatively, as a sociocultural phenomenon requiring intervention to instill more peaceful behavior. Rather, reducing conflict in the region involves the need to establish security and the rule of law in the region, which is only a distant possibility despite the current fixation by national governments (as well as regional organizations such as IGAD and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) on regional economic integration as a mechanism for reducing conflict across the Horn of Africa, including in the Karimojong Cluster (Healy et al. 2009; Moller 2009).

Needed: Economic transformation specific to the region

While conflict reduction in the Karimojong Cluster could very well be assisted by an economic transformation, that transformation must be specific to the region, including the fact of its remoteness from large markets and centers of political power. To reduce conflict in the Karimojong Cluster, economic transformation needs to be about creating sustainable livelihoods for those who live there because once they lose their herds, they have few other opportunities to productively sustain themselves and their families. Hand in hand with this is the need to encourage social connectivity among the various herding groups across the many borders that divide the Karimojong Cluster in order to reestablish greater mobility, more flexible access to resources, and growth in trade and exchange relations through which these herding groups can acquire the means to restore their livelihoods or, at least, to cope with ecological uncertainty and variability.

The breakdown of grazing agreements facilitated by AU-IBAR in the Karimojong Cluster showed the difficulty of implementing fixed agreements for sharing natural resources in nonequilibrium environments. Fluidity in precolonial pastoralist social relations was determined by flexibility and mobility in accessing the widest range possible of the resources needed to live with uncertainty. Reciprocal grazing agreements—an important part of pastoralist social relations in the past—were constantly renegotiated and also often failed when ecological conditions changed. In nonequilibrium rangeland contexts, it is crucial to encourage the strongest possible social and economic ties among different livelihood

groups, for this can serve as a means of building the confidence and trust needed to ease negotiating access to natural resources, even as ecological conditions change. In short, encouraging open dialogue might very well be more effective than negotiating a set agreement when it comes to sharing natural resources in nonequilibrium environments.

Local acceptance and support of peacebuilding efforts

A number of competing factors influence the success of peacebuilding efforts in the Karimojong Cluster. This section discusses some of the most notable factors that raise doubts and concerns—including the inadequate use of confidence-building measures—regarding the potential to achieve prolonged peace in the region.

Many factors raise doubts and concerns

Another lesson learned from peacebuilding efforts in the Karimojong Cluster is that the success of such efforts depends on unequivocal local acceptance and support, and this has been lacking—with no clearer evidence than that the region remains insecure; no clear transition to peace is in sight; and raiding continues unabated, sustained by long-standing factors. As noted earlier, many peacebuilding initiatives in the region have been externally driven. On the positive side, some peacebuilding groups have used traditional peace symbols and prioritized involvement by traditional leaders and women (rather than by local administrative officials, many of whom are regarded by local people as unimportant to the process), and this has broadened participation in peace efforts. However, the proliferation of such initiatives over a relatively short period of time and coordination failures among the various aid agencies involved have raised doubts and concerns, which have reduced local support. Competition for donor support also raised doubts and concerns.

Insufficient use of confidence-building measures

Acceptance and support of peacebuilding work has been further compromised because local-level confidence in such efforts has not been sufficiently built. Failing to adequately engage pastoralist communities prior to engaging in reconciliation efforts has hampered promoters of peace from both local civil society and outside aid agencies. Aid and government agencies have struggled to communicate their notions of peace in an environment where conflict is routine and a normal feature of pastoralist social relations, implying that agencies must articulate their intentions earlier in the process and find better ways to explain their efforts—ways that more deeply take into consideration the experiences and perceptions of pastoralist communities and their approaches to coping with chronic insecurity.

CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS

Transitions to peace do not happen in a vacuum or in isolation from deeper and wider historical and structural factors. In the case of the Karimojong Cluster, efforts to promote peace have been hampered by the deeply embedded nature of armed violence in the region and by the failure of state governments to articulate policies and act in ways that protect pastoralists and promote their livelihoods.

Economic integration as a peacebuilding concept

Addressing the livelihood concerns of pastoralists in the Karimojong Cluster, including reducing conflict, will become more important as this region becomes more integrated into regional and national economies. As briefly noted earlier, national governments (and regional organizations) in the Horn of Africa are seeking to increase ways in which regional areas, including the drylands of the Karimojong Cluster, can contribute to national and cross-border economic development, such as by supporting increased livestock production for export to the Arabian Peninsula. Other concepts include developing commercial agricultural plantations along permanent rivers as well as water- and wind-powered sources to generate electricity for national power grids. Indeed, economic integration across the region is the latest peacebuilding concept, with the thought that such economic integration will raise the opportunity cost of engaging in conflict (Healy et al. 2009). Yet, the same supportive, integrative ties between pastoralist societies in the Karimojong Cluster that have eased social and economic adaptation across borders (such as through trade and exchange relations) are today working equally well to help conceal and facilitate the transport and sale of stolen livestock.

Security concerns persist

At the regional level, IGAD's conflict early warning system (CEWARN, assisted by FEWS-Net) continues to collect and analyze significant amounts of data on armed violence in and around Turkana, in particular, that should help generate a clearer picture of conflict dynamics in the region. Yet, as noted earlier, there is a lack of effective, early response to such information. On the ground, local police and administrative officials who lack basic communications equipment and transport support are incapable of responding quickly to incidents. Thus, despite the existence of an early warning system and an emergent policy and institutional structure for preventing and responding to conflict, this has not yet been translated into greater protection on the ground.

Uganda

At present, most pastoralists in the Karimojong Cluster continue to rely on their own ways of protecting life and property and to regard the state itself as part of the problem. As Stites and colleagues have explained, the failure of Ugandan

authorities to provide security for disarmed communities has dented confidence in that nation state's ability to protect physical safety and household assets (Stites et al. 2007). Thus, communities disarmed by the Ugandan military have rearmed to defend their lives and their livelihoods.

Kenya

On the Kenyan side of the Karimojong Cluster, however, since 2003, the government has taken new and notable steps toward developing an institutional framework for supporting decentralized peacebuilding efforts, primarily in the direction of prevention. First, the National Steering Committee on Conflict Management was established in the Office of the President to institutionalize district peace and development committees, a new status that gave these committees a more official and substantial role in preventing conflict. Today, these committees, as well as district security committees, are still based in towns across the arid and semiarid region of northern Kenya, the former trying to prevent conflict, and the latter trying to respond to violent incidents. In addition, the Kenyan government is considering a policy framework for conflict prevention.

Both the official status of localized peace and development committees in Kenya and a national policy framework for conflict prevention should provide a locus for peacebuilding efforts and incorporation of natural resource management concerns into broader economic development approaches. Further, the Kenyan government's establishment of the Ministry of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands in 2008 has been viewed by pastoralist leaders as a sign of a new, political commitment to address both security and development problems in pastoralist areas.

Region's economic development and pastoralist livelihoods

While it has been hoped that the increasing economic importance of drylands to regional and national economic development would occasion new efforts to strengthen pastoralist livelihoods, including by building peace, in practice, thus far, this has not been the case. For example, Ethiopia has continued to build the Gibe III Dam on the Omo River as a source of hydroelectric power, even though the Omo River provides up to 90 percent of the total water flowing into Lake Turkana and is, therefore, an important livelihoods resource for the Turkana people. Despite strong opposition by Turkana civil society and political leaders to the Gibe III Dam, the Kenyan government signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in 2006 allowing Kenya to import electricity generated by the project (International Rivers 2011).

Improvement of pastoralist livelihoods?

Although steps have been taken, the development interests of national governments, supported by regional organizations, are still not aligned with objectives

to improve livelihoods for the majority of pastoralists in the Karimojong Cluster. Currently, large-scale development schemes involving the drylands are focused first and foremost on contributing to national economic development in a way that will result in wealth creation for pastoralist elites (such as large-scale livestock traders and exporters and others with the status and influence necessary to gain access to coveted lands) and not, necessarily, in a way that will improve the livelihoods of the majority. Thus, considerable hurdles remain to be overcome in the realization of true peace in the Karimojong Cluster.

REFERENCES

BBC News Online. 2006. Cattle raids "kill 38" in Kenya. January 19.

Broch-Due, V., and F. Storas. 1983. The fields of the foe: Amana emoit; Factors constraining agricultural output and farmers capacity for participation—A socio-anthropological case study of household economy among the inhabitants on Katilu irrigation scheme, Turkana, Kenya. Bergen, Norway: Bergen University.

Buchanan-Smith, M., and J. Lind. 2005. Armed violence and poverty in northern Kenya: A case study for the armed violence and poverty initiative. Bradford, UK: Centre for International Cooperation and Security, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford.

CAPE Unit (Community Animal Health and Participatory Epidemiology Unit). 2004. *Assessing the impact of conflict management activities in the Karamojong Cluster*. Nairobi, Kenya: African Union–Interafrican Bureau for Animal Resources.

Cullis, A., and A. Pacey. 1992. *A development dialogue: Rainwater harvesting in Turkana*. London: ITDG.

Daily Nation. 1999. Cattle rustling big time business. July 21.

Dietz, T. 1993. The state, the market and the decline of pastoralism: Challenging some myths, with evidence from West Pokot in Kenya and Uganda. In *Conflict and the decline of pastoralism in the Horn of Africa*, ed. J. Markakis and J. Basingstoke. New York: Macmillan.

Eaton, D. 2008. The business of peace: Raiding and peace work along the Kenya-Uganda border (Part I). *African Affairs* 107 (426): 89–110.

Economist. 1999. Kenya's lawless bush. May 13.

Fratkin, E. 1991. *Surviving drought and development: Ariaal pastoralists of northern Kenya*. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Gettleman, J. 2009. Lush land dries up, withering Kenya's hopes. *New York Times*, September 8.

Goldsmith, P. 1997. *Cattle, khat, and guns: Trade, conflict, and security on northern Kenya's highland-lowland interface*. Nairobi, Kenya: Institute of Policy Analysis and Research and United States Agency for International Development Greater Horn of Africa Initiative.

Grahn, R. 2005. Lessons learned from conflict management work in the Karimojong Cluster. Drylands Programme Issues Paper No. 137. London: International Institute for Environment and Development.

Gray, S. J. 2000. A memory of loss: Ecological politics, local history, and the evolution of Karimojong violence. *Human Organization* 59 (4): 401–418.

Healy, S., C. Cramer, D. Styan, and D. Leonard. 2009. *The economics of conflict and integration in the Horn of Africa*. London: Chatham House.

Hendrickson, D., J. Armon, and R. Mearns. 1998. Conflict and vulnerability to famine: Livestock raiding in Turkana, Kenya. Drylands Programme Issues Paper No. 80. London: International Institute for Environment and Development.

Hogg, R. 1987. Settlement, pastoralism and the commons: The ideology and practice of irrigation development in northern Kenya. In *Conservation in Africa: People, policies and practice*, ed. D. Anderson and R. Grove. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Independent. 2005. Kenya army steps in as cattle rustling turns lethal. July 23.

International Rivers. 2011. Ethiopia's Gibe III Dam: Sowing hunger and conflict. www.internationalrivers.org/files/attached-files/gibe3factsheet2011.pdf.

Kamenju, J., M. Singo, and F. Wairagu. 2003. *Terrorized citizens: Profiling small arms and insecurity in the North Rift region of Kenya*. Nairobi, Kenya: Security Research and Information Centre.

Knighton, B. 2003. The state as raider among the Karamojong: "Where there are no guns, they use the threat of guns." *Africa* 73 (3): 427–455.

Lamphear, J. 1992. *The scattering time: Turkana responses to colonial rule*. Oxford, UK: Clarendon.

———. 1994. The evolution of Ateker "new model" armies. In *Ethnicity and conflict in the Horn of Africa*, ed. K. Fukui and J. Markakis. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.

Lind, J. 2006. Supporting pastoralist livelihoods in Eastern Africa through peace building. *Development* 49:111–115.

———. 2007. Fortune and loss in an environment of violence: Living with chronic instability in south Turkana, Kenya. Unpublished Ph.D. diss., King's College London, University of London.

Lind, J., and S. Eriksen. 2006. The impacts of conflict on household coping strategies: Evidence from Turkana and Kitui districts in Kenya. *Die Erde* 137 (3): 249–270.

Little, M. A., R. Dyson-Hudson, and J. T. McCabe. 1999. Ecology of south Turkana. In *Turkana herders of the dry savanna: Ecology and biobehavioral response of nomads to an uncertain environment*, ed. M. A. Little and P. W. Leslie. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Little, P. D. 1985. Absentee herd owners and part-time pastoralists: The political economy of resource use in northern Kenya. *Human Ecology* 13 (2): 131–151.

McCabe, J. T. 2004. *Cattle brings us to our enemies: Turkana ecology, politics, and raiding in a disequilibrium system*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Mirzeler, M., and C. Young. 2000. Pastoral politics in the northeast periphery in Uganda: AK-47 as change agent. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 38 (3): 407–429.

Mkutu, K. A. 2006. Small arms and light weapons among pastoral groups in the Kenya-Uganda border area. *African Affairs* 106 (422): 47–70.

Moller, B. 2009. Africa's sub-regional organisations: Seamless web or patchwork? Crisis States Research Center Working Paper No. 56. London, UK: Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics.

Monbiot, G. 1994. *No man's lands: An investigative journey through Kenya and Tanzania*. London: Picador.

Oxfam-GB (Oxfam–Great Britain). 2003. Oxfam GB-funded peace building initiatives in the arid districts of Kenya: Lessons and challenges. Nairobi, Kenya.

Pike, I. L. 2004. The biosocial consequences of life on the run: A case study of Turkana of Kenya. *Human Organization* 63 (2): 221–235.

Sobania, N. W. 1990. Social relations as an aspect of property rights: Northern Kenya in the pre-colonial and colonial periods. In *Property, poverty and people: Changing rights in property and problems of pastoral development*, ed. P. T. W. Baxter and R. Hogg. Manchester, UK: Department of Social Anthropology, University of Manchester, and the International Development Centre.

Stites, E., D. Akabwai, D. Mazurana, and P. Ateyo. 2007. Angering Akuju: Survival and suffering in Karamoja. Medford, MA: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University.

Stites, E., and D. Akabwai. 2009. Changing roles, shifting risks: Livelihood impacts of disarmament in Karamoja, Uganda. Medford, MA: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University.

Waller, R. D. 1999. Pastoral poverty in historical perspective. In *The poor are not us: Poverty and pastoralism in Eastern Africa*, ed. D. Anderson and V. Broch-Due. London: James Currey.

Zaal, F., and T. Dietz. 1999. Of markets, meat, maize and milk: Pastoral commoditization in Kenya. In *The poor are not us: Poverty and pastoralism in Eastern Africa*, ed. D. Anderson and V. Broch-Due. London: James Currey.