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

Foreword

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Foreword
Saving lives, losing livelihoods

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We live in an age of uniquely contradictory trends. Fewer lives are being lost to war, conflict, and terror than in previous decades (Human Security Report Project 2010). At the same time, the number of people affected by natural disasters has dramatically increased because vulnerable communities are increasingly exposed to extreme weather events (Vos et al. 2010). Thus, although the number of lives lost has decreased overall, more people are losing livelihoods, as well as their homes and other assets, to natural disasters.

There has been a steady decrease in child mortality worldwide and an increase in life expectancy in all but a handful of the world's 190 nations (World Bank 2011, 2013). But the economic distance between rich and poor nations is more extreme and more visible than ever before. When my great-grandfather was born in Norway, it was a dirt-poor country, and the richest nations were three times richer than the poorest. Now my country is among the very richest in the world—and a hundred times richer than one of the poorest nations.

We should be encouraged that in the post–Cold War era, the international community has become much better at ending wars and limiting conflicts. Accordingly, the number of armed conflicts has decreased over the past twenty years (UCDP 2012a). For conflicts with more than 1,000 casualties per year, the decrease is particularly encouraging: in Africa, for example, the number of larger armed conflicts was three times higher in the late 1990s than it is today, although it is worth noting that local, natural resource–based conflicts increased over this same time span (UCDP 2012b).

Yet during my thirty years of humanitarian, peace, and human rights work, one contradiction has stood out as especially striking: we keep people alive, but we fail to give them a productive life. In many of the developing and conflict-prone countries that I have visited, we end conflicts and save lives like never before, but too often fail to provide the young, the poor, and the vulnerable with the livelihoods they need to lead the lives they deserve. We fail to build the self-sustaining economies that can lift the bottom 2 billion people out of the abject poverty created by strife, exploitation, armed conflict, and disasters.

A SENSE OF INJUSTICE

Many of the world's poorest people have a sense that the system is stacked against them—that their futures will be as bleak as their present. They feel that they will never have access to the livelihoods and careers of those in developed countries. The data that support their sense of injustice are stark.

Today, a handful of individuals possess greater wealth than the total assets of the poorest billion; in fact, these individuals' wealth exceeds the combined gross national product of the least-developed countries. The poorest 40 percent of the world's population possess 5 percent of global income, whereas the richest 20 percent own 75 percent of global income. To make things worse, 80 percent of the world's population lives in countries where income differentials are increasing (UNDP 2007).

Whether these realities make today's world more unjust than previous ages is debatable, but there is one undeniable new factor: more people *perceive* the world as profoundly unjust—because in the interdependent global village of today, more people know of the enormous distance between the top few and the bottom many. In my grandparents' time, it was not well-known how people in other nations lived or how unevenly global wealth was distributed. Today, even in the remotest, poorest, and most chaotic places on the planet, people know that there are extreme differences in quality of life from one society to the next. The young and the restless learn of the great disparities by surfing the internet. Thus, in societies where people still struggle to get a primary education, it is known that elsewhere, the majority of the population receive from fifteen to twenty years of education—including primary and secondary school, and then either university or vocational training. It is known that pets in many rich societies eat better than children in poor societies. Finally, it is known that in some societies, many people receive sophisticated medical treatments over the course of their lives, whereas other societies lack even enough primary health care to prevent death from diarrhea.

Thus, even at a time when most people are seeing substantial progress in their lives, and there is reason for great optimism, there is also cause for great anger, especially concerning the 1.4 billion youngsters who should be in school or entering productive adult lives—but are not. Who can imagine the volcanic sense of injustice building among these unemployed, uneducated, underengaged youth? For them, the playing field is not level, nor are their opportunities equal. And it is in this context that we have seen, in recent years, the rise of radical demagogues who thrive on the pent-up anger of the disenfranchised—demonizing other civilizations, religions, and neighboring regions to foment conflict based on dangerous and inaccurate stereotypes. This book explores the important links between supporting livelihoods and building confidence to achieve a more productive and satisfying future.

LESSONS FROM PEACEBUILDING: THE IMPORTANCE OF SUPPORTING LIVELIHOODS

From my participation in more than ten peace processes as a mediator, facilitator, observer, or donor representative, I have learned that it is difficult to make bitter

enemies agree to a peace plan. And as difficult as it is to achieve an agreement, it is even more difficult to implement it (Egeland 2008). Years of intense conflict create a climate of mistrust and suspicion that can be poisonous when trying to reach consensus on the protection of minority populations, the return of refugees, the reintegration of excombatants, the guarantee of human rights, and efforts (such as truth-finding processes) to address past abuses.

Protracted armed conflict, when combined with high-level, internationally mediated peace processes, can create unrealistic expectations of social and economic progress that cannot be achieved within the time frame that is usually set out in the agreed-upon implementation schedules. I have seen from close up—in Palestine after the Oslo I Accord in 1993, in Bosnia after the Dayton Accords, in Guatemala after the 1996 peace deal, and in South Sudan after the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement—that the so-called peace dividend takes more time to realize than expected (Egeland 2008). Instead, the immediate post-war period is usually not one of economic growth but of stagnation and disorder.

One of the greatest challenges to securing a lasting peace is the reintegration of excombatants. To prevent relapse into conflict, it is important to reintegrate former fighters into civilian life; but the cost of doing so is inevitably higher than expected (and much higher than keeping them in uniform). Moreover, many of the programs designed to prepare former combatants for civilian work are unsuited for the local social and cultural context or natural resource base. As a result, they are unable to absorb those who may only know one thing: how to fight.

If we are to build robust and peaceful societies, nothing is more important than creating and sustaining livelihoods. If communities fail to transform natural resources and youthful labor into economic development, and thereby provide sustainable livelihoods, there will always be the threat of more conflict, more strife, and more disasters. This is what I saw, firsthand, as a United Nations Envoy, as a Red Cross official, and as a Norwegian State Secretary visiting Guatemala and El Salvador, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, northern Uganda and South Sudan, Mali and Burundi, Bosnia and Kosovo, Nepal and Cambodia. In most of these war-torn societies, peace was and is definitively breaking out. But livelihoods and the wider economic recovery remain extremely fragile. Criminal violence is unacceptably high, and reintegration of former combatants is incomplete. Economic development is slow (and reversible), and unemployment is dangerously high—in part because of conflict-related changes, including population displacement, and the unsustainable use of natural resources and land.

Livelihoods in post-conflict situations often depend on a common natural resource, with multiple and often overlapping rights. And the rules of ownership, as we understand them in developed countries, often do not apply. Relations between farming and pastoralist groups who previously shared local resources may have irrevocably broken down during the conflict—a problem that may not be addressed by a peace agreement between warring factions at a higher level. This was the case in the central highlands of Afghanistan, where ownership and rights of access to pastures used by both Pashtun nomads and settled

Hazara communities have been contested, contributing to protracted conflict over recent decades. Similarly, in the Karimojong Cluster of Kenya and Uganda, continuing conflict and violence have created widespread insecurity, undermining the livelihoods of local pastoralists. It is important for international organizations operating in particular areas to understand that traditional or local dispute resolution practices—not top-down edicts—are often the best means of repairing broken relations.

This book is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the role of livelihoods and natural resources in post-conflict peacebuilding. The chapters analyze how peacebuilding can be achieved beyond ceasefires and demobilization ceremonies. They also show how natural resources, which are often available in abundance in the midst of conflict and poverty, can help build sustainable economies, jobs, homes, and services, instead of becoming a curse that leads to corruption, inequality, and divisiveness. Finally, the chapters demonstrate how we can avoid having hard-won peace accords collapse and new tensions develop, simply because there was no alternative income for those who lived by the gun and no peace dividends for civilians who lived in the cross fire.

MULTILATERAL ACTION AND LIVELIHOODS PROTECTION

As the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, I saw time and again how effective multilateral action with local and regional partners could bring relief and emergency health care to large communities. Through the UN, we coordinated massive, lifesaving international relief efforts in response to the Indian Ocean tsunami and the Darfur crisis in 2004, the South Asian earthquake in 2005, the Lebanon war in 2006, and humanitarian disasters in the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa. While far too many people lost their lives in these overwhelming emergencies, lives were also saved because multilateral action, building on local capacities, has become so much more effective than in previous generations.

Too often, however, collective humanitarian action still fails after the emergency phase. We fail because the countries participating in multilateral action often lack unity of purpose. We fail, tragically and repeatedly, when the UN and regional organizations are not provided with the needed political will, or the minimum of economic and security resources, from their member states. Ongoing suffering in many conflict-ridden societies, from Somalia to Colombia, and among growing numbers of climate-change victims in developing countries, stems from a lack of coherent peacebuilding efforts, failure to engage in disaster risk reduction, or simply passive neglect among the leading national, regional, and global actors that could have improved the situation.

To succeed, international action must be timely, it must be coherent, and it must include planning for long-term development after the immediate humanitarian crisis is addressed. Back in 2003 and early 2004, I did believe—naively, it now appears—that the growing Darfur crisis would improve when we managed to bring it to the attention of world leaders. This was, after all, no tsunami,

earthquake, or forest fire: the violence and the ethnic cleansing were human caused—and, we believed, could be reversed by humans. But the international response was neither united nor coherent (Egeland 2008). There was too little diplomatic, political, security, and developmental investment in preventing the conflict, in stopping the government-sponsored abuse, and in supporting the sustainable livelihoods of both farmers and pastoralists in drylands where changing land use patterns and insecure land tenure had become a source of conflict.

The only early and sizable international operation in Darfur was, again, humanitarian, which succeeded in reaching displaced persons and refugees once a humanitarian ceasefire agreement had been negotiated in April 2004. The scaling-up of humanitarian operations from a tiny presence to one that eventually delivered assistance to more than 3.5 million people—and that, by 2005, had successfully reduced malnutrition and mortality rates—was an unprecedented achievement. However, with the failure of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement, the emergency-affected population was left in limbo, largely because even protracted humanitarian aid was insufficient to address the underlying vulnerabilities and build resilient livelihoods.

In addition to increasing understanding of (1) the vital link between natural resources and local livelihoods and (2) the importance of environmental protection for peace and recovery, the Darfur humanitarian operations contributed crucial lessons on the environmental implications of humanitarian action, sensitizing humanitarians worldwide to their environmental footprint (Tearfund 2007; Bromwich 2008). The result was increasingly effective relief efforts, including improved food distribution and emergency health care—which led, in turn, to rapidly dropping mortality rates. At the same time, the effort revealed that humanitarian aid is only a first step in peacebuilding and does not provide the sustainable, long-term programs that are needed to build security, governmental institutions, and livelihoods (Bromwich 2008). Our efforts in Darfur did not stop the atrocities, help refugees to return home, or create security. Nor did they protect or support livelihoods, or provide livelihood alternatives, all of which could have encouraged reconciliation among the various groups that seemed to be locked in competition for scarce water and land. Moreover, the humanitarian initiatives exacerbated the underlying environmental degradation that had led these groups to compete for scarce resources (Tearfund 2007).

Today, there are several times more internally displaced persons, refugees, and destitute victims of the Darfur conflict than there were when we started our work in the winter of 2003–2004. By 2009, the World Food Programme Emergency Operation estimated that 3.8 million, or a clear majority of Darfuris, continued to be food insecure and to rely on food handouts because prolonged displacement and insecurity had deprived them of their livelihoods (WFP 2010). In a drylands environment where the economy and local livelihoods are largely based on agriculture, both sedentary farming and pastoralist livestock production require support in order to ensure more equitable development and peaceful comanagement of natural resources.

CLIMATE CHANGE: REDUCING THE RISK OF NATURAL DISASTERS

A paralysis similar to what we have seen in Darfur is costing lives in the context of a very different global challenge: climate change. If UN member nations had managed to curb greenhouse gas emissions—as they agreed to do at the 1992 Earth Summit, in Rio de Janeiro—there might not have been such a relentless increase in the number of lives devastated by extreme weather events, nor such heightened vulnerability among the 2 billion poorest people on our planet.

Many more people have been displaced by natural disasters than by armed conflicts. Over five years, 144 million people have been forced from their homes, with 83 percent of this displacement triggered by climate- and weather-related hazards such as floods, storms, and wildfires (IDMC 2013). As a result of increasing atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations and growing societal vulnerability to climatic conditions, extreme weather and climatic events are likely to increase in frequency, magnitude, and consequence—putting peacebuilding and post-conflict development efforts at risk. A society undergoing a tenuous post-conflict recovery is particularly vulnerable to natural disasters. To worsen matters, the two are often related, as in the case of Darfur, which has a long history of drought-related famine and food insecurity linked to climate variability. Approximately 90 percent of current disasters are associated with weather and climatic factors such as strong winds, heavy rain (resulting in floods), absence of rain (resulting in droughts), and very high or very low temperatures (WMO 2011). Climate change has driven up the intensity, frequency, duration, spatial extent, and damage of extreme weather and climatic events (IPCC 2012). Floods and storms alone account for almost three-quarters of recorded disasters (WMO 2011). As a consequence of decades of conflict, poverty, bad governance, and overpopulation, many countries have become so vulnerable that even small natural events can lead to considerable damage and loss of income and jobs. Climate-related events can also substantially limit livelihood options, as well as exhaust the resources societies and communities require to prepare for and respond to future disasters (IPCC 2012). Good preventive action, planning, and preparation can substantially diminish levels of exposure and vulnerability, reducing loss of life and loss of livelihoods. Important steps—such as the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action and the Global Framework for Climate Services—are being taken to plan for and counteract extreme climate effects and preserve livelihoods.[1]

In 2005, I presided over the World Conference on Disaster Reduction—held in Kobe, Japan—which endorsed the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015, whose goal is to increase disaster resilience in both communities and nations. The framework is an ambitious plan of action that emphasizes preparedness,

[1] For more information on the Hyogo Framework for Action, see www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/hfa.

awareness, and risk reduction, in order to help build societies that are capable of protecting lives and livelihoods.

Through 2010, I chaired a task force that initiated the development of a global system to provide climate information, predictions, and advice that will protect the lives, livelihoods, and homes of vulnerable people. This task force proposed the Global Framework for Climate Services, which has since been set up and will provide substantial social and economic benefits through contributions to development, disaster risk reduction, and climate change adaptation (WMO 2011).[2] While all countries stand to gain from participation in this framework, our task force believes that priority should be given to climate-vulnerable developing countries (particularly African countries), the least-developed countries, landlocked developing countries, and small island developing states, where livelihoods are most at risk and where climate services are also often weakest.

A number of countries and organizations are collaborating on the Global Risk Identification Programme, led by the United Nations Development Programme, to develop sustainable national risk-information systems that would include comprehensive, multihazard national risk profiles.[3] Climate information is also being increasingly used in routine risk-reduction operations, including preparedness and response efforts undertaken by humanitarian organizations: for example, in parts of Africa that are subject to drought or excessive rainfall, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the World Food Programme are relying on climate and weather predictions to ensure that supplies and capacities are sufficient to cope with potential climate and weather-related stresses (WMO 2011). Such efforts will enhance post-conflict countries' understanding of the importance of promoting livelihoods that are resilient to climate change.

NETWORKS OF THE LIKE-MINDED

Even though we have failed so far to lift the bottom billions out of poverty, today the world is seeing an unprecedented network of like-minded intergovernmental, governmental, and nongovernmental organizations channeling investments toward livelihoods support, community resilience, and economic redevelopment. National developmental and humanitarian agencies can feed, vaccinate, and provide primary school for children for a couple of dollars a day, even in the most remote crisis areas. But they can be more effective if post-conflict humanitarian assistance is integrated with longer-term reconstruction, including livelihood creation.

Such investment is, dollar for dollar, more cost efficient than anything I know of anywhere in the private or public sector. Local nongovernmental groups

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[2] For more information on the Global Framework for Climate Services, see www.gfcs-climate.org/content/about-gfcs.

[3] For more information on the Global Risk Identification Programme, see www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/projects_initiatives/global_risk_identificationprogramme/.

working with international agencies can and should speak up more systematically for neglected peoples and communities. In fact, hundreds of humanitarian and human rights organizations are already holding governments in crisis-affected countries accountable for what will be most beneficial to neglected peoples and communities—namely, sustainable and resilient livelihoods.

In the future we must think more strategically, and more locally, about our long-term efforts to sustain livelihoods and make societies resilient to hazards and strife. We must work more closely with local government and civil society to strengthen their capacity for handling crises and exercising good governance. We must find better ways to forge coordination and partnerships locally, nationally, and internationally. Through such collaborative actions, we will be better able to tap local resources and local expertise. Time and again we see, as in recent natural disasters, that more lives are saved in earthquakes, floods, and tsunamis by local groups than by any expensive airborne fire brigade. Similarly, it is usually local and regional actors who make or break peacebuilding efforts, and who should be empowered to create local livelihoods based on local natural resources.

Never before has there been a generation with the resources, the technology, the political mandate, and the knowledge necessary to realize peacebuilding and development worldwide. For us it is a question of will—and, as this book so clearly demonstrates, the will first of all to ask and to learn what works, and what is needed, to create and preserve sustainable livelihoods in countries recovering from conflict.

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